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The Bonds of Brotherhood
New Evidence on Sino–North Korean Exchanges,
1950–1954
✣ Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus
Scholars have often noted that the Soviet Union’s reluctance to en-
ter the Korean War resulted in signiªcant changes in North Korea’s interna-
tional alignments. Speciªcally, the war induced North Koreans to look less to
the Soviet Union for advice, inºuence, and support, and more to the People’s
Republic of China (PRC).1 On the battleªeld and behind the front lines, the
war accelerated contacts between North Korean leaders and their Chinese
comrades. In the postwar period, China behaved generously toward the
North Koreans, offering food, material aid, monetary support, and laborers.
Until recently, however, the general lack of primary documents on these
topics meant that China’s greater importance in North Korean foreign rela-
tions in the 1950s was mostly a matter of conjecture. This article uses evi-
dence from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Archive to ªll part of
the documentary gap.2 The documents illuminate a range of issues, including
how the PRC dealt with North Korean refugees and retreating soldiers ºood-
ing into China, welcomed North Korean students and cultural groups travel-
1. Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 2005), p. 19; Balázs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Rela-
tions and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Cen-
ter Press, 2005), p. 32; and Robert A. Scalapino and Chong Sik-Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I: The
Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 475–476. Bruce Cumings emphasizes
Chinese inºuence after 1947. See his The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cata-
ract, 1947–1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 350–370. For Chinese cul-
tural inºuence in North Korea prior to the war, see Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus, “International-
ist Culture in North Korea,” Review of Korean Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 134–142. For
caveats suggesting limits to Chinese inºuence on North Korea’s decision to attack the South, see Chen
Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1994), p. 111.
2. For general information on the archive and its holdings, history, and future, see Christian F.
Ostermann, “Archival Thaw in China,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 16 (Fall
2007–Spring 2008), pp. 1–6.
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ing in the PRC, and shufºed Pyongyang’s requests between Zhou Enlai and
the Northeast People’s Government. The wide range of documented Sino–
North Korean contacts, particularly those concerning repatriation, shed light
on this signiªcant transitional period. The PRC MFA archival holdings not
only provide information about a rich diversity of personalities involved in
Sino–North Korean relations, they also contain a small number of Korean-
language documents from the Beijing embassy of the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea (DPRK), documents that represent a tentative step toward
developing a more complete understanding of what the war and its Chinese-
dominated aftermath looked like from Pyongyang.
The MFA documents, together with the three volumes of Zhou Enlai’s
manuscripts published in April 2008, shed valuable light on Zhou’s concerns
during the Korean War.3 Supplementing these materials are recently declassi-
ªed intelligence estimates produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) during and after the Korean War. The documents suggest that al-
though Sino–North Korean relations at that time did not yet eclipse North
Korea’s ties with the Soviet Union, Chinese economic and military inºuence
with North Korea was growing faster than Soviet inºuence.4 Finally, docu-
ments collected and translated by the Cold War International History Project
and the North Korea International Documentation Project further strengthen
an interpretation of China’s vigorous role in North Korean affairs during and
after the Korean War.5 In emphasizing some of the lower-level contacts in the
Sino–North Korean relationship, this article traces how North Korea’s rela-
tionship with China evolved in the 1950s.6
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3. Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai Wengao [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai since the founding of the Republic],
3 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2008) (hereinafter referred to as JYZEW, with ap-
propriate volume and page information).
4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Ofªce of Current Intelligence, “Relative Inºuence
of the Soviet Union and Communist China in North Korea,” 21 May 1953, p. 1, in CIA-
RDP91T01172R000200300029-7, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. Such sources must be used with some caution.
At times the CIA relied mainly on information from Chinese and North Korean newspapers or from
individual accounts, and U.S. foreign policy biases sometimes skewed the materials. Furthermore,
these sources by no means offer a comprehensive view of Sino–North Korean relations. Their value
lies in the abundant and detailed economic and industrial data offered. All CIA sources cited in this
article come from CREST, a huge digitized collection at NARA.
5. See the Cold War International History Project’s collection on the Korean War at http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id1409&fuseactionva2.browse&sortCollection
&itemThe%20Korean%20War.
6. Shen Zhihua’s recent work departs from discussion of the Korean War’s origins but remains focused
on the Sino–North Korean relationship at the highest levels only. Similarly, Andrei Lankov has called
for a more thorough assessment of the Sino–North Korean relationship, but he himself rarely departs
from discussion of top leaders. See Shen Zhihua, “Sino–North Korean Conºict and Its Resolution
during the Korean War,” trans. by Dong Gil Kim and Jeffrey Becker, Cold War International History
Project Bulletin, No. 14/15 (Winter 2003–Spring 2004), pp. 9–24; and Lankov, Crisis in North Korea,
p. 6.
Sino-Korean Population Movements
In October 1949 the North Korean government became one of the ªrst to es-
tablish diplomatic ties with the PRC. After receiving an ofªcial request from
DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong on 4 October, Zhou Enlai sent an af-
ªrmative response.7 Zhou and Pak, however, were merely codifying what had
been a loosely structured relationship between the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and North Korea for many years. Political, military, economic, and
cultural exchange had been taking place along the Sino-Korean frontier
throughout the Chinese Civil War. Most signiªcantly, North Korea’s northern
provinces had served as a strategic sanctuary for People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) soldiers and supplies during pivotal stages of the civil war in the north-
east, sparing many lives and countless goods from Kuomintang destruction.8
But the Sino-Korean relationship was not just a one-way street beneªting
North Korea. Kim Il-Sung was convinced that a Chinese Communist victory
would have important political and social implications for his regime. After
1948, when the Chinese Communist victory seemed more and more immi-
nent, North Korean media outlets closely followed campaigns in the war and
made special note of each city that fell to the CCP.9 To readers, this suggested
the political tides in East Asia were turning in North Korea’s favor, and specu-
lation inevitably arose that Syngman Rhee’s fate would soon mirror that of
Jiang Jieshi’s. By 1949 the Chinese Civil War had become a central event in
North Korean society, and the CCP victory was both welcomed and cele-
brated. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in October
capped what had been an important and reciprocal relationship since 1945.
In the spring of 1950, North Korea and the PRC were consolidating
power domestically while preparing the grounds for overrunning their respec-
tive rival southern states. In this period, communications between Beijing and
Pyongyang were sporadic, but one avenue of cooperation for the two Com-
munist states was the return of Korean soldiers and cadres from China. In
early 1950, an outstanding matter remained concerning the repatriation to
North Korea of ethnic Korean soldiers who had fought with the PLA during
29
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7. See “Chaoxian yuan yu wo jianli waijiao guanxi shi zhi Zhou Enlai zongli de han (Zhongwen,
Chaowen)” [Letter to Premiere Zhou Enlai on North Korea’s willingness to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with China (Chinese, Korean)], 4 October 1949–6 October 1950, p. 6, in Doc. No. 106-
00001-01, MFA Archive, Beijing.
8. Kim Donggil, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjunzhong de Chaoxianshi hui Chaoxian wenti xinshen”
[Some new insights into the return of the ethnic Korean divisions in the PLA to North Korea], Lishi
yanjiu [History Research], No. 6 (2000), pp. 103–114; Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The
Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 318–322; Chen,
China’s Road to the Korean War, pp. 106–113; and Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, pp. 350–370.
9. Cathcart and Kraus, “Internationalist Culture in North Korea,” pp. 134–142.
the Chinese Civil War.10 In January 1950, the CCP arranged for representa-
tives of Kim Il-Sung to come to Wuhan to receive some 14,000 Korean sol-
diers of the Fourth Field Army, along with their weaponry.11 Although the re-
turn of Koreans to China to join Kim Il-Sung’s Korean People’s Army (KPA)
is typically regarded as a pre–Korean War phenomenon, it in fact continued
well into the autumn of 1950.12 Although the numbers sent back were not
immense in the summer and fall of 1950, the return of ethnic Korean sol-
diers, families, workers, and students to North Korea was an extensive pro-
cess, coordinated at all levels of the Chinese government and military, includ-
ing the MFA, the Ministry of the Interior, the PLA North China Military
Area, the Northeast Foreign Affairs Bureau, and provincial and city govern-
ments. The North Korean embassy in China was also an important player in
moving repatriations forward.13 The MFA holdings do not force a radical shift
from ªndings in previous scholarship, but the documents do suggest how the
returning soldiers augmented KPA strength and technical ability, and they re-
veal both the social dimensions and the prewar ºuidity between the bound-
aries of the PLA and the Korean People’s Army. In March 1950 the Northern
Military District of the PLA was in contact with the MFA in Beijing about re-
turning groups of Korean soldiers.14 PLA ofªcers took signiªcant time to lay
out in detail individual cases of the would-be KPA, providing context for the
Koreans who wished to cross the border, changing their national and military
afªliations.15 On 11 April 1950 the PLA informed the MFA that they had
sent back ten Korean mechanics from the Second Mechanized Division of
the PLA in northern China, relinquishing their technical expertise to the
30
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10. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, pp. 106–111; and Cumings, Origins of the Korean War,
pp. 362–365.
11. “Junwei tongyi di si yezhanjun zhong Chaoxian guanbing hui Chaoxian de dianbao,” [Telegrams
of the Central Military Commission agreeing to have Korean soldiers in the Fourth Field Army return
to North Korea], January 1950, in Jianguo Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao (JYLSW) [Manuscripts of Liu
Shaoqi since the founding of the Republic], 4 vols. Beijing : Zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 1993–
2005),Vol. 1, pp. 319–321. (henceforth cited as JYLSW).
12. Kim Donggil, “Reconsideration: Repatriation of the Ethnic Korean Divisions in the PLA to North
Korea in 1949 and 1950,” unpublished working paper, 2008; and Kim Donggil, “Zhongguo renmin
jiefangjunzhong de Chaoxianshi hui Chaoxian wenti xinshen” [Some New Insights into the Return of
Ethnic Korean Divisions in the PLA to North Korea in 1949 and 1950], Lishi yanjiu, No. 6 (2006),
pp. 103–114.
13. “Wo tiedao bingtuan Chaoxian budui huiguo jiaoyu wenti de laiwanghan” [Correspondence on
the problem of educating our railroad military units returning to China from Korea], 21–27 May
1950, p. 6, in Doc. No. 118-00077-01, MFA Archive; and “Chaoxian shiguan pairen gei wo tiedao
bingtuan budui zuo huiguo jiaoyu baogao de lairenhan” [Correspondence from Korean embassy dele-
gate regarding the enactment of return-to-country education for Korean units in our railroad military
corps], 12–20 June 1950, in Doc. No. 118-00077-02, MFA Archive.
14. “Jiefangjun Huabei junqu Chaoxianji renyuan jia qing huiguo shi de laiwanghan” [Communica-
tion on the matter of members of Korean nationality in the People’s Liberation Army North China
Military Area], 9 March 1950, pp. 1–7, in Doc. No. 118-00080-01, MFA Archive.
15. Ibid., March–April 1950, pp. 13–29.
KPA.16 In May 1950, as the ethnic Koreans left China to become KPA sol-
diers, their families stayed behind in the PRC and sought concrete beneªts
from PRC bureaucracies.17 Because the matter of their nationality was com-
plex (many had been in China for a decade or more), no immediate decisions
were made about giving these families social beneªts, which would have been
on a par with those enjoyed by other Chinese PLA veterans.18
Data from the MFA Archive do not fundamentally shake the established
reasons for Chinese intervention in the Korean War, but the information does
describe the care the central leaders in Beijing took in coordinating policy
with the North Korean comrades.19 Mao may have been taken by alarm by
the timing of Kim Il-Sung’s invasion (an act that threw Mao’s Taiwan calculus
to the winds and evened the score for the Minsaengdan incident of 1932),
but the CCP remained in close contact with the North Korean government in
the spring of 1950. Often, repatriation issues were at the core of Sino-North
Korean contacts.
With the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula on 25 June 1950, the
pace of requests quickened. Many Koreans in China wished to return to Ko-
rea to ªght. A survey by the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Northeast People’s
Government found that 38 male Korean soldiers entered North Korea from
Manchuria in June 1950, 8 in July, 61 in August, and 4 in September. August
was also the high point for repatriation of North Korean cadres from China.
That month, a total of 104 cadres (including 2 females), accompanied by 61
soldiers and 59 workers, returned to Korea.20 In addition to soldiers, the CCP
Central Committee on 18 July ordered the Northeast People’s Government—
led by the ubiquitous Gao Gang—to mobilize Korean-nationality doctors,
nurses, drivers, mining engineers, and ordnance personnel to return to North
Korea, where they “[were] all much needed.”21 Requests for repatriation con-
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16. Ibid., 11 April 1950, p. 32.
17. “Waijiaobu guanyu zai Zhongguo de Chaoxianren huiguo canjun qi jiashu shifou an jun shu you
dai wenti zhi zhongyangjunwei han” [Letter from the Foreign Ministry to the Central Military Com-
mission concerning the question of preferential treatment for family members of Koreans in China re-
patriating to North Korea to join the army], 25 May 1950, in Doc. No. 118-00080-03, MFA Archive.
18. For general information on the nationality issue among Korean soldiers who had fought in the
Chinese Civil War, see Gao Yongyi, Zhongguo Chaoxianzu lishi Yanjiu [Historical research on Chinese
Koreans] (Yanbian, China: Yanbian Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2007), p. 416; and Kim Chun-seon, “The Set-
tlement and Repatriation of Koreans in Northeast China after Liberation,” Korea Journal (Fall 2004),
pp. 85–110.
19. For a detailed review of Mao Zedong and the CCP’s decision to enter the Korean War, see Chen
Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War; and Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-
American Confrontations, 1949–58 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).
20. “Dongbei waishiju guanyu neipai Chaoxian ganbu ji gui guo ganbu qingkuang huibao” [Collected
report by Northeast Foreign Affairs Bureau regarding internal North Korean cadres and those return-
ing to their country], 19 September 1950, p. 2, in Doc. No. 118-00080-06, MFA Archive.
21. “Zhongyang guanyu dongyuan Chaoxianji jishurenyuan huiguoshi gei gao gang de dianbao”
tinued to arrive at the MFA, some from Kim Il-Sung himself, at least into
September, and at one point the Northeast People’s Government even offered
to pay the “household allowances” for Korean drivers returning home.22
When North Korea made a request to PRC Ambassador Ni Zhiliang to sup-
ply 500 soldiers to operate radios, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong criticized the
chain of command for such a sensitive issue. The Chinese leaders afterward
suggested that these personnel instead be selected “from the Korean students
in Yanji”—a further indication that transferring Koreans from northeast
China back to North Korea was a recurring issue.23 The total of 347 repatria-
tions to Korea from Manchuria described in the MFA documents from June
to September 1950 is hardly an overwhelming number, but indicates that
China was carefully tracking the number of returning Koreans. The number
also throws into statistical relief the huge contrast between the small number
of Koreans going south from Manchuria and the exponentially increasing
numbers of refugees moving in the opposite direction, seeking entrance into
China.24
Given the intense Chinese propaganda support for the North Korean war
effort, questions arose about the Korean repatriates and would-be repatriates,
who were leaving their families behind in China. The families expected pref-
erential treatment, as had been the case for PLA families in the Chinese Civil
War, but the matter ªrst had to be debated in Beijing.25 The question of ac-
cording beneªts to families of Korean soldiers in China was, in some sense, a
question that replicated China’s larger dilemma as 1950 lengthened: To what
extent would rhetorical support for North Korea extend to material support
32
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[Telegram to Gao Gang concerning the mobilization of Korean-nationality technicians to return to
Korea], 18 July 1950, in JYZEW, Vol. 3, p. 60.
22. Central Committee, “Zhongyang guanyu dongyuan Chaoxianji jishurenyuan huiguoshi gei gao
gang de dianbao” [Telegram to Gao Gang concerning the mobilization of Korean nationality techni-
cians to return to Korea], 18 July 1950, in JYZEW, Vol. 3, p. 60; Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu tongyi
Chaoxian zai Zhongguo sheli cangku deng gei ni zhiliang deng de dianbao” [Telegram to Ni Zhiliang,
etc., concerning agreement with North Korea to set up warehouses in China and other matters],
29 September 1950, in JYZEW, Vol. 3, pp. 345–346; and Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu dongyuan zai dong-
bei de Chaoxian renyuan huiguo shi gei gao gang deng de dianbao” [Telegram to Gao Gang, etc., con-
cerning the matter of mobilization of Korean personnel in northeast China to return to Korea], 4 Oc-
tober 1950, in JYZEW, Vol. 3, p. 381.
23. Central Committee, “Zhongyang guanyu cong Chaoxian choudiao wuxiandianhuayuan shi gei
Gao Gang de dianbao” [Telegram to Gao Gang concerning the transfer of radio operators from North
Korea], 25 August 1950, in JYZEW, Vol. 3, pp. 199–200.
24. “Dongbei waishiju guanyu neipai Chaoxian ganbu ji gui guo ganbu qingkuang huibao,” 19 Sep-
tember 1950.
25. “Neibuwu guanyu zai Zhongguo de Chaoxianren huiguo canjun qi jiaoshu shifo anjun shuyoudai
wenti zhi waijiaobu han” [Internal Affairs Department Response letter to foreign ministry concerning
the question of whether or not to extend preferential treatment for family members of Koreans in
China repatriating to North Korea to join the army], 18 September 1950, in Doc. No. 118-00080-02,
MFA Archive.
in the struggle? The views of local governments on this matter had to be taken
into account by the ministries in Beijing, which were themselves handling
various requests from localities about Koreans seeking beneªts.26 Demand for
beneªts was such that the MFA had to reply in a blanket statement to all in-
ternal affairs bureaus, stating that the families were ineligible for Chinese gov-
ernment funding. Denying PRC beneªts to North Korean–afªliated families
in China made them all the more likely to look to Pyongyang for support.27
However, tensions over these matters were rarely acknowledged in public.
Instead, the North Korean attack on the South, the rapid initial “liberation”
of Seoul, and the unexpected intervention of the United States in the conºict
elicited strident Chinese declarations of support for North Korea. Waves of
pro-North demonstrations and publications ºowed throughout China.28 At
the North Korean embassy in Beijing, Kim Il-Sung’s neglected channel for
conveying his war plan to Mao, diplomats expressed a desire to participate in
Chinese activities denouncing the United States for “invading” Taiwan.29
With such tender steps, the North Korean embassy moved into a position of
greater coordination with the Chinese MFA as the two countries plunged for-
ward into the often unwilling embrace of cooperation. The halting internal
cooperation between Chinese and North Korean diplomats indicates that,
whatever the vehemence of the anti-American demonstrations in Chinese cit-
ies and towns, declarations of Sino–North Korean brotherhood did not auto-
matically lead to ºawless coordination in the early Korean War.30
One aspect of the war that brought the two Communist governments
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26. “Waijiaobu fu neiwubu guanyu Chaoxian huiguo canjun qi jiayu bu yuyi junyu youyu han” [For-
eign Ministry reply letter to internal affairs departments indicating that preferential treatment not be
extended to families of Koreans returning to North Korea to join the army], 2 November 1950, in
Doc. No. 118-00080-04, MFA Archive.
27. For a roughly contemporaneous example of ethnic Koreans in border regions of China turning to
Pyongyang for material support in the absence of funding from Beijing, see “Dongbei Jiaoyubu
Yanbian Daxue guanyu yu Chaoxian jianli tushu jiaohuan guanxi de xinjian; Tushu mulu; Tong-
jibiao[Letters from Northeast Education Bureau/Yanbian University regarding establishment of li-
brary exchange connections with North Korea], June 1950, in File No. 18, Yanbian University Ar-
chive, Yanji, China.
28. A good example of propaganda in Sichuan is Chuandong Junqu Wenyi Yeshu [East Sichuan Mili-
tary Region Arts Publishers], eds., Ai Zu Guo: Kangmei Yuanchao Jiji [Love the motherland: Collec-
tion of dramas to resist America and aid Korea] (Chongqing: Chongqing lianhe yuanshu chubanshe
fuyin, 1951). For pro–North Korean songs in Guangdong, see Li Caiguang, ed., Kangmei Yuanchao
Gequ [Songs to resist America and aid Korea] (Guangzhou: Zhonghua yuexue shenyinxing, 1950).
29. “Guanyu Chaoxian zhuHua shiguan renyuan canjia wo fanmei qinChao qinTai huodongshi” [Re-
garding the matter of a committee from the Korean embassy participating in our “anti-U.S. invading
Korea and Taiwan’ activities”], 19 July 1950, in Doc. No. 117-00034-03, MFA Archive. For a rebuttal
of the notion of an “invasion” of Taiwan by American troops, see Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and
Hope, 1946–1952, Vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 354.
30. A much fuller explanation of this is available in draft conference proceedings. See Chen Jian,
“Limits of the ‘Lips and Teeth Alliance’: The Antinomies of the Chinese–North Korean Relations,”
Symposium at Cornell University, 29–30 September 2006.
into rapid alignment was the magnitude of U.S. air superiority over the Ko-
rean Peninsula.31 U.S. bombing reaped a toll not just on the forward positions
of the KPA but increasingly on the rear areas and cities of North Korea.
Whereas the U.S. air strategy in July 1950 had focused on blunting the force
of KPA front-line attacks south of the 38th parallel, U.S. bombers in August
and September increasingly rained ªre on North Korea itself.32 Pyongyang in
particular was being bombed regularly, eliciting dramatic dispatches from the
Chinese embassy there.33 DPRK government agencies began moving north
toward Sinuiju and Kanggye.34 The aerial destruction was also triggering the
movement of refugees out of North Korea into China, a problem the North
Korean embassy in Beijing was quick to admit. The issue of refugees from
North Korea thus became central to the question of the Korean War’s poten-
tial impact on China.35 The MFA data appear, then, to conªrm Allen Whit-
ing’s 1963 speculation in China Crosses the Yalu: Preventing a wave of refugees
from crossing into the northeast was a signiªcant part of Beijing’s internal ra-
tionale for action in Korea. The alternative was to accept the quasi-permanent
status of North Korean consulates and enclaves up and down the border from
Dandong to Ji’an/Tonghua and on to Yanbian in the north. What Whiting
and others did not realize, however, is the forceful role of the North Korean
government in arguing for the setup of its immigration ofªces north of the
Yalu.
On 2 August 1950, concerned about the uncontrolled outºow of refu-
gees into Manchuria, the North Korean embassy in Beijing took the unusual
step of petitioning the Chinese MFA for the establishment of a DPRK con-
sular ofªce in Andong. Andong (today Dandong) was the largest Chinese city
34
Cathcart and Kraus
31. Propaganda in northeastern China increasingly projected to the Chinese people images of U.S.
bombing atrocities in North Korea, implying that China could be bombed as well and thereby linking
the self-interest of the Chinese people to that of the suffering North Koreans. For representative exam-
ples, see LüDa ribao [Port Arthur/Dalian daily news], 25 October 1950, p. 6; and LüDa ribao, 11 No-
vember 1950, p. 4.
32. The subject of the air war in Korea is treated at length in Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air
Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (Washington, DC: Ofªce of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1983). See
also Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (Col-
lege Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002).
33. The U.S. air raid on the city on 8 August with about 50 planes prompted the Chinese chargé
d’affaires in Pyongyang to ask Zhou Enlai whether the embassy could be equipped with anti-aircraft
weapons. “Guanyu Chaoxian zhanzheng baofahou Zhongguoshi zhu Chaoxian shiguan bian zhi deng
wenti shi” [Regarding the matter of stafªng the Chinese embassy in North Korea after the outbreak of
the Korean War and other problems], 8 August 1950, pp. 2–3, in Doc. No. 106-00021-09, MFA Ar-
chive.
34. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, p. 730.
35. Whiting’s classic analysis refers to the refugee issue but does not indicate its potential magnitude
within Beijing’s war calculus. See Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the
Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960).
on the Sino-Korean border and the site of extensive bilateral trade via Sinuiju.
During the Korean War, it became the gateway for the vast majority of North
Koreans ºeeing violence on the peninsula. The North Korean request framed
the projected responsibilities of the Andong ofªce as follows: ªrst, to commu-
nicate with the DPRK Foreign Ministry and the embassy in China; second, to
connect with the commercial delegation of the DPRK in northeast China;
and third, to form an ofªce, led by someone at the level of ªrst or second sec-
retary of the North Korean embassy, to handle documentation for citizens of
the DPRK who were temporarily in China, and to issue documents to those
moving about (luxing).36 In concluding this note, the embassy added its desire
to have the ofªce in Andong set up by 15 August 1950, a date perhaps chosen
to coincide with the more positive association of liberation from Japan. Under
any other circumstances 15 August would have been considered a tight dead-
line for setting up such an ofªce in a neighboring sovereign state. Haste, how-
ever, was the order of the day. The document appears to have been written
rapidly and contains a handful of subtle revelations. The Korean original de-
scribes the type of people the Andong ofªce would be helping as “DPRK citi-
zens” (Choson Inmin Minjujui Gonghwaguk kongmin). However, the authors
misspelled the word for “country” (guk), dropping the ªnal consonant. This
unintentional linguistic amputation, even if just a simple typographical error,
constitutes a type of Freudian diplomatic slip reminding us that the DPRK
was indeed disintegrating and that the refugees might well have lost their
homeland in 1950.37 The note also functioned as a tangible acknowledgment
by the DPRK that it was losing control of its own citizens, many of whom
were, in effect, “wandering about” in Manchuria. Such a concession was likely
difªcult for the North Koreans to make, but it presaged Kim Il-Sung’s abject
October request for Chinese intervention on the peninsula.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry moved quickly to respond to North
Korea’s unusual request. In forwarding the request to the Northeast People’s
Government in Shenyang, MFA ofªcials stated that “we agree in principle
to the request by the Korean embassy” to establish an ofªce in Andong. On
35
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36. The “Commercial delegation of the Northeast in Korea” (Dongbei zhu Chaoxian shangye
daibiaotuan) was the de facto Chinese embassy in North Korea until the ofªcial Chinese embassy
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37. “Chaoxian zai Shenyang, Andong, Tonghua shiban shij goushi,” pp. 1–3. The Chinese translation
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9 August, the MFA answered in the afªrmative via an ofªcial note.38 How-
ever, the establishment of the ofªce was delayed, possibly because “accidental”
U.S. air raids that rocked Andong on 24 August and 27 August. These inci-
dents stirred substantial panic in the city and hampered the PRC’s ability to
handle the refugee problem.39 At the local level, however, such attacks likely
prompted consideration of moving all operations further inland, including
those for handling refugees.40 There would be little sense in setting up facili-
ties so close to the border if General MacArthur decided to relinquish the re-
strictions under which he had been broadly operating. Possible chaos in the
North Korean administration may also have been responsible for the delay.
Sinuiju was the logical source for DPRK cadres moving to Andong.41 Despite
these hindrances, by early September the Andong ofªce was in operation.42
As Kim Il-Sung embarked on his euphemistic “temporary” retreat in
October–November 1950, he was pursued by the Far East Air Force (FEAF)
commanded by George E. Stratemeyer. Stratemeyer and MacArthur, in coor-
dinating U.S./UN air strategy, assumed that Kim and his government would
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a pretext for Soviet intervention in July 1950, see Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 346.
40. See documents from Kuandian displayed at the exhibition in the War to Resist America and Aid
Korea Museum, Dandong, Liaoning Province, PRC.
41. For detailed discussion of Andong/Sinuiju ties in the prewar period, see Adam Cathcart and
Charles Kraus, “Peripheral Inºuence: The Sinuiju Student Incident and the Soviet Occupation of
North Korea, 1945–1947,” Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 1–28.
42. Little is known of how this ofªce operated, the names of its staff, or the nature of its interaction
with Andong city government or the local foreign affairs department (Waishichu). Attempts to check
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ºee toward China, the UN forces accordingly showered Sinuiju and the roads
leading to that city with bombs.43 Coupled with U.S. infantry’s northward ad-
vance, the intense bombardment caused disintegrating KPA units to ºee into
Chinese sanctuary to avoid destruction. The neat symmetry this offers has al-
ready been remarked upon: China could now repay North Korea for having
opened its borders in 1946 and 1947 as a sanctuary to CCP forces reeling
from the Chinese Civil War. In 1950, however, as chaos was threatening to
overwhelm the border areas, local ofªcials were likely not hearkening back
with great clarity to prior years. China was not wholly prepared to handle the
outºow of North Korean refugees and was in fact eager to contain the prob-
lem. The Chinese government, aided by the North Korean embassy in
Beijing, estimated that the number of refugees in China in late 1950 had al-
ready surpassed 10,000 people.
In this context, the two or three North Korean consular ofªcials newly
arrived in Andong could function only as an inadequate breakwater for the
inºux of Korean refugees. Although Andong was the preeminent gateway,
North Korean refugees were entering China through multiple corridors. Pres-
sures were being felt along the border crosspoints between Korean Manpo and
Chinese Ji’an and, to a lesser extent, in the far northeast between the North
Korean province of North Hamgyong and the Chinese Yanbian region. On
4 December 1950, the DPRK embassy in Beijing informed the Chinese MFA
of an urgent request to set up a similar ofªce in Tonghua, the urban manufac-
turing and lumber center for Southeast Jilin Province. Tonghua, however, was
about 60 kilometers from the border with North Korea, meaning that tiny
and peripheral Ji’an functioned as the actual gateway to China from North
Korea. Apart from its ancient Koguryo tombs, Ji’an’s main asset was its link to
the North Korean city of Manpo via a black iron bridge built by the Japanese
in the colonial period and protected by a blockhouse.44 But this steel remnant
of Japanese colonial rule was not matched by Chinese administrative muscle.
Ji’an was still just a county-level administration and lacked the infrastructure
necessary for housing large numbers of refugees.45 Because tens of thousands
of Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) were being dispatched to Korea via the
Ji’an bridge, the ºow of refugees traveling in the reverse direction (i.e., into
China) had to be stanched or moved to another area. The need to clear refu-
gees from Ji’an was emphasized on 8 November in a note from the Northeast
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45. Residents in Ji’an, interviews, June 2008 and June 2009.
People’s Government to the Chinese MFA disagreeing with a plan that would
have kept friendly socialist ambassadors, such as the Polish ambassador to
Pyongyang, and their respective staffs in Ji’an. Instead, Gao Gang told Zhou,
ambassadors should be moved to Shenyang, a city with much better capacity
to handle large numbers of foreigners.46 By 10 December 1950, Zhou Enlai
and his vice foreign ministers agreed to allow the Koreans to set up an ofªce in
Tonghua.
The request for the Tonghua ofªce arrived on 4 December, coinciding
with the fall of Pyongyang to Chinese forces and Kim Il-Sung’s visit to Beijing
(Tonghua is not exceedingly far from Kanggye, the remote northwestern
province to which Kim’s cabinet had ºed).47 The request indicated that bat-
tleªeld victories by the reconstituted KPA and Chinese forces were by no
means stanching the ºow of refugees. Because of the prevailing near-paranoia
toward outside inºuence, the local governments were expected to give North
Koreans a wide berth. Tonghua was already serving as a staging point for the
PRC’s rapid reception of Korean groups, many of which came nearly unan-
nounced to Beijing. (These groups were yet another drain on Zhou Enlai’s time
from as early as August 1950.) Although most of these groups were ªrst re-
ceived in Andong, Tonghua, or Shenyang, many of them did not give the cen-
tral government much warning about their arrival in the capital. The inºux of
often-undocumented foreign nationals into Beijing was likely unnerving to the
Chinese and shows the sometimes tentative nature of communications between
Shenyang’s Northeast People’s Government and the MFA.48
Responding to the Northeast People’s Government, Zhou placated Gao
Gang by subtly phrasing the order as a request. He also gave the North Kore-
ans the impression that the Chinese central government needed to deliberate
about the matter when in fact he had been planning all along to accept the re-
quest.
Tonghua has a rich history as a base for northeast Asian governments in
exile. The city was the designated alternate capital for Pu Yi’s disintegrating
Manchukuo regime in August 1945, and Japanese troops held out in the area
until February 1946.49 In December 1950, Tonghua was apparently under
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consideration as a destination for the ºight of the North Korean government.
On 4 October 1950, Stalin had suggested that Kim Il-Sung retreat into Man-
churia with a government-in-exile. Although the Chinese were opposed to the
idea—their invasion of Korea could be seen as an action undertaken to pre-
vent such a scenario—Tonghua was likely seen as the contingency base for the
Korean government.50 The request for the consulates in the northeast serves as
a reminder that if the CPV had not joined the war in Korea, these consular
ofªces might have served as foundations for a resumption of that all-too-
familiar aspect of the twentieth century, the Korean government in exile. As
the head of a beleaguered and nearly destroyed state in 1950, Kim Il-Sung
had at least foreseen the need to keep rear bases in mind, as he had enjoined
his cadres in 1945.51 However, he most likely did not have in mind a retreat
into the very areas where he had plied revolution twenty years earlier.52
For all of China’s strident public rhetoric about the “territorial integrity”
of the northeast region, Zhou Enlai appeared willing to be supremely ºexible
where war allies were concerned. This ºexibility also extended to moving “So-
viet-ethnicity” pilots from Sinuiju to Andong and then on to Shenyang.53
Given the fanfare with which the CCP had expelled U.S. consulates from the
northeast urban centers of Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin in 1948 and
1950, the accusations of U.S. and Japanese spying, and the suspicions that
certain Koreans remained linked to Japanese intelligence, the speed of the
afªrmative MFA response to the North Korean requests is striking.54 Ongoing
local bureaucratic tussles over management of Russians, Japanese, and Kore-
ans already resident in multiethnic Manchuria indicate Zhou Enlai’s determi-
nation to push the pro-Korean policy over the implicit objections of the
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Northeast People’s Government.55 The North Korean request ran precisely
counter to the general trend of exodus from the northeast.56 Perhaps in taking
into account Beijing’s rationale for sending troops to Korea, the desire to pre-
vent a far larger number of refugees from settling in northeastern China
should be considered in light of the new evidence. At the same time, the as-
sent to the North Korean request shows that the PRC did not want to, and
could not, handle the refugee issue unilaterally.
The North Korean authorities also relied on a North Korean commercial
delegation to keep contacts with the Beijing government and, as important,
the Northeast People’s Government led by Gao Gang. A Northeast business
delegation in Korea (Dongbei zhu Chaoxian shangye daibiaotuan) facilitated
wartime communication between the DPRK and the Chinese MFA. Alterna-
tive methods and channels for resolving bilateral issues and for receiving aid
came to the fore. In addition to connecting with the commercial delegation
from Pyongyang, China’s bureaucratic reach extended even into the North
Korean postal system, which had completely broken down, and to working
out communications to China from major North Korean cities.57 The prob-
lem of telegraphs in North Korea had multiplied, and the Chinese embassy in
Pyongyang, though itself struggling to continue work during punishing
bombings, had become the de facto coordinator of the communications of
other proletarian embassies in North Korea. The Chinese chargé d’affaires,
Chai Junwu (later known as Chai Chengwen), ªlling in for the ailing Ambas-
sador Ni Zhiliang, noted in 1950: “The Koreans want to connect to our sys-
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tem (or need help from telegraph bureaus) via Ji’an or Tonghua; a lot of em-
bassies in Korea have this need.”58 A telephone line from Chongjin, the
northeastern Korean port city and capital of North Hamgyong Province, to
Changchun, the heart of Chinese Manchuria, was also discussed, apparently
at the PRC’s urging.
Educational Exchanges
Physical bombardment and warfare created more than just refugees in North
Korea. The war badly mauled the North Korean education system, a system
that prior to the war was seen as a prime state achievement. Dislocations,
deaths, and the war’s voracious need for manpower eviscerated North Korea’s
wartime schools. Not wanting to completely disrupt the development of edu-
cated cadres, however, the DPRK recognized that not all students could serve
their country on the battleªeld. Thus, students whose skills were deemed too
important to risk on the battleªeld were evacuated to China where they could
continue their studies without handicap. Not just soldiers, but interpreters
and the intelligentsia faced great dangers in Korea, a notion reinforced by the
death of Mao Zedong’s eldest son, a Russian-language interpreter, in a U.S.
napalm raid in Korea in 1950. The DPRK, stressing the need to shelter its ed-
ucated citizenry, asked the Chinese government to provide temporary accom-
modation for its most promising students in a variety of disciplines. The Chi-
nese government responded positively to most requests and offered students
opportunities to study in Beijing and the northeast, including at universities
around Yanbian. Allegedly, these students were sometimes handpicked by
Kim Il-Sung. (Kim Jong-Il, although his name cannot be found in MFA doc-
uments, was one of the young students sent to northeastern China during the
war.)59 Toward the end of 1952, Kim Il-Sung, having been relieved of military
command by Peng Dehuai, was focusing on culture and plans for rebuilding
Pyongyang as a socialist capital.60 As part of this drive, the North Korean
leader selected 50 students and cadres from within the party, government, and
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military to go to China to study English.61 These English-language students
joined other traditional students studying abroad in the PRC during the
Korean War.62 The DPRK especially wanted to develop Korean technicians
and gained permission for large numbers of them to study in China. These
technicians were of great beneªt during the postwar reconstruction in North
Korea. In August 1952, the North Korean Foreign Ministry requested that
2,150 students and researchers from Kim Chaek University of Technology,
the Southern University of Technology, and Wonsan Agricultural University
be admitted to China. The North Koreans acknowledged that “for students to
progress in their studies in Korea” was “very difªcult,” thus necessitating their
relocation to China.63 North Korean workers in China were joined by doc-
tors, pharmacists, and other specialists for additional training. The November
1953 economic and cultural agreements formalized exchange programs, but
international students had been coming to China prior to the signing of this
agreement. As early as July 1953, 200 workers from the Ministry of Heavy In-
dustry were sent to China for a six-month program.64 By 1954, more than
2,963 Koreans had been or were in China developing skills to beneªt their
homeland.65
Instead of being a burden on China, these educated North Koreans were
often an asset to the development of China’s northeast, and some even prom-
ised to bring their own grain to avoid depleting China’s limited material re-
sources. The PRC was eager to establish itself as a socialist center of Asian civ-
ilization and did so by moving ahead in areas in which the USSR was less
dominant, such as students, the arts, and women’s groups. The inºow of
North Korean students and artists to China in 1952 and 1953 may well have
occurred absent the Korean War and its daily aerial devastation and creeping
famine. Students, artists, and performing arts delegations all had ªnite tasks
and limited stays in China—quite unlike the most problematic refugees.
Even in the midst of rapid changes and military coordination, Foreign
Minister Zhou Enlai took responsibility for guiding the movements of elite
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North Koreans into China. On 9 November 1950, Zhou made signiªcant re-
visions to a note about handling the relocation of a famous North Korean
dancer, Chae Chongju, who wished to leave North Korea and move her
school, including her students, to Beijing. Zhou approved the matter with ex-
tensive commentary, ordering that the MFA’s cultural ofªce facilitate the
school’s transportation to Beijing.66 In this way, the Chinese became the literal
guardians of North Korean culture during the war.
The war accelerated the trend of cultural exchange and cross-border ºows
of composers, dancers, artists, and writers—as well as soldiers—between the
PRC and the DPRK. Although the DRPK was the recipient of this aid,
the North Korean government demonstrated considerable agency in solicit-
ing the donations. Sending North Korean arts delegations to China as well as
to the USSR and East European “people’s democracies” became an effective
means of stimulating aid during the Korean War.67 Korean orphans in partic-
ular were recognized as a major asset at beneªt concerts and events because
donations by foreign audiences always spiked when they were present.
Aid and Reconstruction
By the time the Korean War ceaseªre agreement was signed in July 1953,
North Korea was in ruins. Throughout the war, China had urged North Ko-
rea to make speedy repairs to infrastructure, particularly sites that served both
military and transportation purposes (e.g., airports), and had coordinated
with the North in making those repairs.68 To avoid losing costly machinery
and factory tools in cities such as Pyongyang and Kaesong, North Korea had
requested that the goods be stowed in northeastern China for the duration of
the war.69 Despite these efforts to minimize damage, however, both the physi-
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Chinese aid and support in reconstruction was thus viewed both positively
and as a necessity by the North Koreans.
Shortages in agricultural output in the early 1950s required the North
Koreans to turn to their Communist allies.71 Food shortages became a recur-
ring problem throughout the war and after but were always met with a swift
response from the Chinese. Although for a time hesitant to reveal the prob-
lems plaguing the rural areas, DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong eventu-
ally divulged to his Chinese comrades that perhaps 27 percent of the popula-
tion in rural areas was starving. To remedy the situation, the USSR and China
quickly appropriated funds for deliveries and supplanted North Korean food
stocks in 1952.72 The Chinese were probably not surprised to hear that the
DPRK’s food stocks were insufªcient. North Korea’s perennial need for food
aid had at that time already become a source of tension in the Sino–North
Korean relationship. In January 1951, Peng Dehuai had levied several strong
complaints against the North Koreans for poor planning. The most serious
problem, he said, was that the North Koreans were failing to provide refugees
in the “newly liberated areas” (xin jie fang qu) south of the 38th parallel with
food and fuel. Instead, North Korean ineptitude resulted in only enough basic
necessities for soldiers, which in turn fostered social unrest and the formation
of local gangs and cliques.73 Hungarian documents suggest that the Chinese,
not wanting to funnel money away carelessly, became more critical of North
Korea’s economic policies in the mid-1950s.74
Still, the Chinese were unwilling to let social unrest boil over in North
Korea.75 The derision the North Koreans received from Peng Dehuai was lim-
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ited to internal dialogue among the Chinese and did not necessarily narrow
the scope of Chinese generosity. Peng himself was committed to delivering
aid. In a discussion with Pak Hon-yong, he remarked:
They say that our government has already resolved to deliver to the Korean gov-
ernment 30,000 tons of grain. I do not know, is this true? If it is not true, I con-
sider that it is necessary to prepare for timely delivery of 30,000 tons of grain in
March for the purpose of providing assistance so that the peasants can engage in
spring planting.76
From February to May 1952, the Chinese delivered 5,000 tons of rice,
5,000 tons of chumiza, and 200 tons of bean oil each month to the North Ko-
reans.77 From January 1954 to September 1955, China transferred 300,000
tons of grain to North Korea.78 Peng Dehuai’s personal role in arguing for this
aid is assumed, but published documentation such as his Nianpu (Chronol-
ogy) offers only brief glimpses of this signiªcant issue.79 North Korean views
of Peng Dehuai are similarly difªcult to assess. Letters of thanks to him from
Kim Tubong and Pak Han-yong are newly available but do little to expose
disagreements between Peng and his North Korean colleagues.80 Both before
and after the war, the Chinese press was quite kind to the North Koreans,
playing up the close cooperation between Pak, Kim Il-Sung, and Peng.
The Chinese also provided extensive monetary aid and were willing to
subsidize trade with North Korea, a policy dating back to the war years as
advocated by Peng Dehuai. Answering Peng’s request for Chinese ªscal aid
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to North Korea in 1952, Mao agreed that 1.6 million yuan was urgently
needed, even though he noted that this amount “exceeds the sum of the trade
credit extended by China to Korea in 1951.”81 Thus, when CIA analysts pre-
dicted in May 1953 that the PRC “desires to increase its economic inºuence
in North Korea,” they were accurately noting the growth of an existing
trend.82
After the war ended, Kim Il-Sung traveled to both the USSR and China
in search of economic aid. He arrived in Beijing on 10 November and stayed
until 27 November, hammering out the details of cooperative agreements in
the ªelds of economics and culture. On 23 November, North Korea and
China signed an economic pact, the beneªts of which were heavily slanted to-
ward the DPRK.83 Beijing offered 800 million yuan in grants, delivering 550
million yuan of promised aid in 1954 and 1955. Furthermore, Kim learned,
much to his delight, that the PRC had cancelled all of North Korea’s debt
from the Korean War.84 Chinese aid outweighed that of the Soviet Union for
some time, although aid from each country served different purposes. China
predominantly supplied non-durable items (consumer products), whereas the
Soviet Union focused on durable goods (capital goods). Thus, although
China funneled more into North Korea in the immediate postwar years, the
long-term beneªt of Soviet aid and investment was probably greater.85 East
German aid during the same period was also substantial, presumably adding
to the weight of Soviet-inºuenced contributions, although even the East Ger-
mans were attracted to Mao and his alternate Communist model.86
The November 1953 economic pact mandated that Chinese monetary
aid be used for food, textiles, cotton, coal, ªshing vessels, farm equipment,
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and paper, as well as for reconstruction supplies, machinery, and railroad re-
pairs.87 China also became the largest supplier of consumer goods to North
Korea, ºooding the market with clothing, toiletries, and utensils.88 As Robert
Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee have noted, even cursory glances through
North Korean journals of the time indicate that KPA troops wore Chinese-
made clothing and were at times equipped with Chinese riºes. Even in DPRK
science laboratories, North Korean students wore Chinese-made garments.89
U.S. bombing raids had wiped out building materials and brickyards,
leaving the North Koreans with little to rebuild their shattered country.90 Set-
ting priorities in such a context was difªcult. Construction of factories and
housing meant that North Korea had to revive its cement industry. Cement
factories were producing one million tons annually at the height of the period
of Japanese control, but these facilities were devastated during the Korean
War. Output in 1954 was approximately one-fourth of the production ªgures
during Japan’s occupation. In areas like Hamhung, North Korea’s inability to
surpass colonial-era production occurred because the United States had used
Japanese blueprints to bomb factories more efªciently.91 The slow pace of
North Korean industrial recovery heightened the signiªcance of PRC-spon-
sored cement shipments to the DPRK for the postwar reconstruction. In
1953–1954, China delivered 100,000 tons of cement.92 With the help of East
German engineers in Hamhung, the DPRK used Chinese cement to rebuild
its infrastructure and erect new apartment ºats.
On the macro-level, China was a safe source of aid for the North. Al-
though the Soviet Union remained the North’s foremost ªnancial benefactor
in reconstructing factories, the PRC also made signiªcant contributions on
this matter. The Chinese rebuilt the Namp’o Glass Works and, complement-
ing their deliveries of consumer goods, constructed a consumer goods manu-
facturing plant in 1954. Beijing also saw that the new railways in North Korea
had general stores alongside them, building such structures in Pyongyang,
Ch’ongju, and Kowon. The stores were entirely funded by the PRC. Chinese
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soldiers also rebuilt important buildings, such as those housing the Foreign
Ministry and the national bank.93 Although smaller socialist states were en-
gaged in similar types of postwar aid, the PRC—unlike the smaller states;
for example, the German Democratic Republic—accomplished its goals in
North Korea without massive propaganda campaigns emphasizing its public
contributions to North Korean restoration.94 Apart from a smaller number of
graphic publications for domestic consumption, the Chinese tended to em-
phasize military heroism in war while deemphasizing their central role in re-
building the North Korean economy. The effort to play down China’s role
stemmed from the PRC’s desire to avoid antagonizing the North Koreans.
Perhaps in no other area did China’s commitment to rebuild North Korea
after the war shine through with more clarity than in the activities of the CPV
from 1953 to 1958. Apart from their obvious role as a deterrent to the South,
these troops also ªlled labor shortages and rebuilt infrastructure. Their impor-
tance to postwar reconstruction should not be underemphasized.95 CPV in-
volvement in reconstructing North Korea’s rail system was signiªcant. Chi-
nese vessels could move unhindered between ports in Dalian and Andong and
Sinuiju, carrying supplies and aid. The Chinese were quite concerned, how-
ever, about land transportation and in linking the railways in North Korea
with those in northeastern China.96 Thus, both during the war and after, the
highest Chinese leaders concerned themselves with rebuilding transportation
systems and saw that Chinese soldiers in North Korea worked alongside KPA
troops to rebuild the railways.97 The CIA estimated that as many as 40,000
Chinese railway workers and 54,000 construction workers from northeast
China were living in North Korea.98 Although these numbers cannot yet be
veriªed in the Chinese archives, even if the CIA estimates are inaccurate by a
factor of ten, such aid would still be signiªcant. Chinese efforts to reconstruct
North Korea’s transportation systems added agility and strength to the North
Korean economy. This aspect of Sino–North Korean cooperation sufªciently
worried the U.S./UN forces in Korea that they attempted, in leaºets dropped
in profusion on North Korea, to make a major issue of Chinese control of the
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transportation system, asserting that China was behaving arrogantly and was
unconcerned about North Korean civilians.99
However, rail ties between the two countries were not without their
difªculties. In the Chinese border city of Ji’an in 1954, a train arriving from
North Korea killed two Chinese workers, resulting in a distressed local popu-
lace and worried internal dialogue in the Chinese MFA about handling the
case discreetly. The North Koreans, whose KPA soldiers had been running the
train, asserted that they were not at fault; Chinese reports on the incident as-
serted recklessness by the KPA. Annoyed by the lack of information forth-
coming from the North Korean side, Chinese bureaucrats sought to ªnd out
the North Korean military regulations for such incidents.100 Word of the Ji’an
deaths no doubt raced through local communities, and, although the deaths
were not publicized in northeastern newspapers, they put a sharper edge on
the “brotherly” attitude toward North Korea with which the Chinese regime
sought to inculcate its citizens and soldiers in the border regions.
The CPV also caused problems in North Korea, as could the soldiers’
Chinese counterparts living as civilians in the DPRK. At times, the CPV’s
presence became overbearing and imperious, resulting in what North Koreans
perceived as ºagrant violations of their national sovereignty. In 1954, contro-
versy arose about whether the CPV was permitted to hang the PRC ºag in
North Korea. Wanting to avoid potential problems with the North Korean
government, the Chinese MFA instructed the PLA that the ºag could be
raised only if the North Koreans had no objections.101 The inevitable relations
between lonely CPV soldiers and North Korean women (some of them war-
time widows) also caused problems, albeit ones that were rarely discussed.102
U.S. and South Korean propaganda leaºets that had blanketed North Korea
during the war had repeatedly drummed on themes such as the supposed dirt-
iness, hunger, and imperious nature of the CPV.103 Chinese soldiers may also
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have noted with more than saintly detachment the reported postwar spike in
libidinous activity among North Korean youth no longer oppressed by war’s
dislocations.104 In all cases, the uncertainty accorded to North Korean na-
tional sovereignty, implicit in the stationing of CPV units across Korea, high-
lighted the sensitivities present. Interviews with CPV veterans, such as those
conducted by Li Xiaobing, surveys of memoirs by veterans, and careful analy-
sis of propaganda ªlms from the 1950s depicting the CPV in North Korea
might ªll in some of the gaps in the study of the social role or function played
by Chinese troops.105 Further work can also be done in the MFA Archive.
Conclusion
Chinese soldiers remained in the DPRK for an additional ªve years, and their
interaction with the North Korean state and populace remains a signiªcant
research frontier for scholars of the Cold War. In measuring the amount of
work left to be done by historians of Northeast Asia, one might juxtapose the
current scattering of scholarship regarding the Chinese “occupation” of North
Korea with Norman Naimark’s immense, admirable monograph on the Soviet
occupation of eastern Germany.106 The gap is great and in need of ªlling. Yet
many of the relevant archives—particularly, regional Chinese archives—are
closed to Western scholars, and Chinese scholars are too often unable to pub-
lish their writings on Sino–North Korean relations because of the tremendous
political sensitivities of the sharp-eyed—and vocal—readers in the North Ko-
rean embassy in Beijing. We might have to await a new crop of fearless Chi-
nese graduate students or South Korean scholars trained in China to unearth
or explain these issues in their full complexity.107
In addition to the issues raised in this article, the MFA Archive contains
several additional groups of documents whose analysis might shed further light
on China’s relations with North Korea in the 1950s. Bacteriological warfare
(BW) allegations in 1952 and 1953 were an important means of cementing
Sino–North Korean solidarity, and a handful of new documents indicate an
earlier coordinating interest in the matter. North Korean interest in China’s re-
50
Cathcart and Kraus
104. Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, “The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea,” in Robert
Scalapino, ed., North Korea Today (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 19.
105. “Who Is the Most Loveable Person?” Renmin ribao, 26 August 2008.
106. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945–1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
107. In 2008, Beijing University inaugurated its Institute of Korean Studies, a venue that might be the
origin of such young scholars. Well-established institutes such as the University of North Korean
Studies in Seoul seem, for the time being, to have taken less interest in China as a historical player in
North Korea than they might.
search on Japanese BW crimes dates back at least to December 1949, when the
authorities in Beijing began publicizing Soviet trials of Unit 731 members at
Khabarovsk. Did China’s drive to stamp out the legacies of Japan’s hated Unit
731 signiªcantly affect North Korean Health Ministry ofªcials, particularly
when such educated leaders were likely spending time in northeast China be-
fore 1952? A related question regards the degree of propaganda coordination
that had occurred between the two sides prior to the biological warfare allega-
tions of February 1952. Chinese leader Guo Moruo played an active role in
propagandizing the BW issue and the Chinese cause within North Korea and
globally, and his trips to Pyongyang and Sinuiju might be proªtably analyzed.
Local Chinese archives are the next frontier, but in the meantime even in-
depth studies based on local newspapers or publications (difangzhi) would
sufªce for improving our understanding of Chinese–North Korean dynamics
both near the border and beyond. Work by doctoral students and other young
scholars tramping around Manchuria, as well as by those ªguratively plunder-
ing the immense cache of captured North Korean documents in College Park,
Maryland, remain promising and interesting.108 What is most needed is
greater study of interactions at the county and city level in what might be
called the Sino–North Korean “contact zones.”109 The persistent work by
scholars to peer around the edge of North Korean archives has also yielded
some gains. Further gains might be possible if some kind of academic ex-
change were included as part of a diplomatic agreement with the North.
Divergent pasts in East Asia frequently reveal their ability to interfere
with a common future, and North Korea is no exception. The history of
China’s inºuence on North Korea may provide food for thought today. Al-
though policymakers seem to have grasped that the relationship with the PRC
is North Korea’s most important bilateral relationship by far, the tensions and
speciªc issues inherent in the alliance are rarely understood. Understanding
the historical underpinnings of the relationship and how the PRC has re-
sponded to past humanitarian and political crises in North Korea is highly in-
structive. North Korea has largely purged the PRC from its own stylized his-
tory, but political changes on the peninsula, particularly if they result in a
more vigorous Chinese role—a role surely contemplated by DPRK diplomats
on those long and instructive train rides from Sinuiju to Beijing—may even-
tually return North Korea to its Chinese past.
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